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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-New Mexico Court of Appeals

Defines the Scope of a Lawful Inventory Search of a
Detainee Under the New Mexico Detoxification Act-State

v. Johnson
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Johnson,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that police officers
did not violate the New Mexico Detoxification Act' (Detox Act) by taking Kenneth
Johnson (Johnson) to jail and searching his person. In Johnson, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals addressed a case of first impression in New Mexico. The case
addressed the authority of police to detain intoxicated persons and search them under
the regulations set forth in the Detox Act. This Note discusses the court's
interpretation of the Detox Act, analyzes the court's rationale with regard to
inventory searches, explores the implications of this decision in New Mexico and
discusses alternatives the court could have employed.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, Johnson, was riding in a vehicle driven by Charles McKee
(McKee). Officer Rodriguez stopped Johnson and McKee for a headlight violation.3
Officer Rodriguez checked the vehicle, found that there was an outstanding warrant
for McKee's arrest, and called Officer Randall for backup. Johnson appeared to be
intoxicated because he had slurred speech, his eyes were bloodshot, and he smelled
strongly of alcohol. Subsequently, Johnson was placed into a squad car. He did not
resist but protested with profane language and was "somewhat combative."4
Officers Rodriguez and Randall proceeded to search the vehicle. They found
marijuana, rolling papers, and a stolen handgun. Both McKee and Johnson denied
ownership of the handgun.
The officers took McKee and Johnson to jail. The officers asked Johnson to
remove his clothing and to replace them with jail clothing. When Johnson refused,
the officers forcibly removed his clothing. While removing Johnson's clothing, a
plastic "Life Savers Holes" roll containing seven rocks of crack cocaine fell out of
Johnson's pocket. He was subsequently arrested and charged with trafficking a
controlled substance with intent to sell.
Johnson argued that he was unlawfully taken to jail, stripped of his clothing, and
exhaustively searched.5 Johnson claimed the police did not have authority under the
Detox Act to imprison him because the evidence did not clearly and convincingly
establish that he was disorderly and incapable of caring for himself if taken home.6

1. 122 N.M. 713, 930 P.2d 1165 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 122 N.M. 578, 929 P.2d 269 (1996).
2. Detoxification Act of 1973, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2-16 to -22 (Repl. Pamp. 1993).
3. Johnson, 122 N.M. at 715-16, 930 P.2d at 1167-68. Unless otherwise cited, all subsequent references to
the facts of this case refer to this citation.
4. Johnson, 122 N.M. at 716, 930 P.2d at 1168.
5. See Defendant's Brief In Chief at 1, State v. Johnson, 122 N.M. 713,930 P.2d 1165 (Ct. App. 1996) (No.
16,554).
6. See id. at 5. The Detoxification Act provides:
A. A peace officer or public service officer may transport an intoxicated person to his
residence when it appears to the peace officer or public service officer that the intoxicated person
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Johnson argued that the Detox Act provides police with three choices when dealing
with an intoxicated person: 1) transport the person to his or her residence; 2)
transport the person to the nearest health care facility; or 3) transport the person to
jail.7 These choices, and their restrictions on liberty, vary depending on an
intoxicated person's behavior.8 Johnson claimed the officers' use of the most
restrictive alternative, taking Johnson to jail, was inappropriate because the
requirements of section 43-2-18(C) were not satisfied.9
Johnson also argued that the search of his "Life Savers" container, which resulted
in the discovery of crack cocaine, was unreasonable and illegal because he was only
a temporary, civil detainee and therefore entitled to broader Fourth Amendment
protection than a criminal arrestee.' °
The court of appeals rejected these arguments and found that there was sufficient
evidence to show that Johnson was disorderly and constituted a danger."'
Additionally, the court held that inventory searches apply equally to criminal
arrestees and civil detainees and that the inventory search was warranted in this
case. 12 Therefore, the court held that the discovery of the crack cocaine in the "Life
Savers" container was not unlawful and the search was conducted according to
established procedure. 3
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

Development and Purpose of the DetoxificationAct
The federal courts began addressing the difficult issue of criminality of public
intoxication in the late sixties.14 In 1966, two federal appellate courts addressed this

will thereby become orderly and able to care for his own safety.
B. A peace officer or public service officer may transport an intoxicated person to the nearest
health care facility within the county when it appears to the peace officer or public service officer
that the intoxicated person is unable to care for his own safety or in need of medical attention.
C. A peace officer or public service officer may transport to the city or county jail an
intoxicated person who has become disorderly when it appears that the intoxicated person:
(1)has no residence in the county in which he is apprehended; or
(2) is unable to care for his own safety; or
(3) constitutes a danger to others if not transported to jail.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2-18(A)-(C).
7. See Defendant's Brief In Chief at 6,Johnson (No. 16,554). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2-18(A)-(C).
8. See Defendant's Brief In Chief at 8, Johnson (No. 16,554).
9. See id. at 7. Johnson claimed there was not a sufficient showing of disorderly conduct or that he posed
a danger to others if not taken to jail. See id. at 9.
10. See id. at 12.
11. See Johnson, 122 N.M. at 716, 930 P.2d at 1168. The court found that there was sufficient evidence that
Johnson was disorderly and constituted a danger based on: 1)his appearance of intoxication; 2) his use of profane
language; 3) his combative behavior; and 4) the discovery-of a stolen handgun. See id. at 717, 930 P.2d at 1169.
12. See id.
at 718,930 P.2d at 1170. Inventory searches apply equally to criminal arrestees and civil detainees
because the purpose behind such a search is to protect the detainees' possessions and to protect the detainee and other
persons in jail from dangerous materials. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Christine Wellington, Note, Why Do We Still Lock Up Drunks? Examining the Protective Custody
Provisionof the Alcoholism Treatment and RehabilitationLaw of Massachusetts, 17 NEW ENG. J.ON CRIM. & CIV.
CoNFmENT 371,375 (1991). See also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th
Cir. 1966); Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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issue." In Driverv. Hinnant,"the Fourth Circuit faced the issue of whether a chronic
alcoholic could be criminally convicted and sentenced for public drunkenness. The
court held that a chronic alcoholic cannot be classified as a criminal if his public
drunkenness is the involuntary result of disease. 7
In Easterv. Districtof Columbia,8 the District of Columbia Circuit Court (D.C.
Circuit) held that because alcoholism is a disease and chronic alcoholics cannot avoid
public drunkenness, they should not be punished for public intoxication.' 9 The D.C.
Circuit distinguished chronic alcoholism from voluntary intoxication and held that
public drunkenness laws would still be enforced against those who are voluntarily
intoxicated.2'
In Powell v. Texas,21 the Supreme Court disagreed with the federal circuit courts
and refused to find that chronic alcoholism was a disease. The Court held instead that
criminal laws prohibiting public drunkenness were constitutional.' The Court
concluded that criminal sanctions were imposed on the defendant for public
drunkenness, not for being an alcoholic.'
Following the Powell decision, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970
(Federal Rehab Act).24 The enactment of the Federal Rehab Act marked a national
trend toward a more sympathetic view of alcoholism.' This reform movement
recognized the criminal justice system's inability to handle alcohol abuse and
attempted to decriminalize public drunkenness.'
In 1971, the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act27 (Uniform
Treatment Act) was developed to aid states in creating laws compatible with the
Federal Rehab Act.28 A majority of United States jurisdictions have decriminalized
public drunkenness and provided for some form of police assistance to intoxicated
persons. 29 The New Mexico Detox Act can be traced to this trend of
decriminalization of public drunkenness that began in the 1970s. New Mexico
decriminalized public drunkenness when it enacted the Detox Act in 1973. 30 In 1991,

15. See Wellington, supra note 14, at 375.
16. 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). The Fourth Circuit was determining the constitutionality of criminalizing
public drunkenness.
17. See id. at 765. However, the court premised its holding on the presence of chronic alcoholism, which has
been recognized as a disease. See id. Thus, the court distinguished the merely excessive, voluntary drinker from an
addictive drinker. See id.
18. 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
19. Seeid. at51.
20. See id. at 53.
21. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
22. See id. at 530. The Supreme Court did not make a distinction between voluntary and chronic intoxication.
See id.
23. See id. at 517.
24. Pub. L. No. 91-616, 84 Stat. 1848 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4541-4594 (1994)).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 1663,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970) (Congress recognized the need to develop humane
and effective prevention and treatment programs for alcoholism).
26. See Wellington, supranote 14, at 374.
27. UNIF. ALCOHOLISM AND INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT §§ 1-38, 9 U.L.A. 79 (1988).

28. See Wellington, supranote 14, at 376.
29. See id. at 390.
30. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2-16 to -22 (Repl. Pamp. 1993).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 28

only 20 states, including New Mexico, allowed police to detain intoxicated persons
in jail.31
Public officers in New Mexico can now assist intoxicated persons, rather than
arrest them.32 However, while there is no arrest under the Detox Act in New Mexico,
an intoxicated person can still be taken to jail if disorderly and a danger to others.33
Civil Detention of Intoxicated Persons in Jail
There is no New Mexico case law regarding the rules police officers should follow
when taking an intoxicated person to jail under the New Mexico Detox Act. Lawful
detention under the Detox Act is an issue of first impression in New Mexico. 4 Thus,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals looked to other jurisdictions for guidance in
determining when an officer may lawfully detain an intoxicated person in jail.
Under the Detox Act, an officer may transport an intoxicated person to jail when
two elements have been met. First, the intoxicated person must exhibit disorderly
conduct. Second, an intoxicated person must either: 1) have no residence in the
county; 2) be unable to care for himself; or 3) constitute a danger to himself or others
if not transported to jail. 35 In Johnson, the court had to interpret what constitutes
"disorderly" under the Detox Act and define what evidence is necessary to establish
that an intoxicated person is a danger to himself or others.3 6
B.

1. Defining "Disorderly"
Jurisdictions have taken divergent views in attempting to define disorderly. Some
have adopted the criminal definition of disorderly conduct, 37 while others have
defined disorderly in a non-criminal manner.38
The First Circuit in Veiga v. McGee held that when a statutory definition of a term
is lacking, the understanding of that term in an analogous statute can guide the court
in its interpretation. 39 The Veiga court, therefore, determined that the definition of
disorderly in a non-criminal statute is the same as the definition of disorderly as
applied to a criminal statute.40 The fact that one statute is "penal," and the other is
not, "does not detract from the former's value as a guide to the latter."'
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Cesaroni v. Smith defined
"disorderly" as causing annoying or disturbing conditions.42 The Cesaronicourt set

31. See Wellington, supra note 14, at 391 & n.173.
32. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-18(A)-(B).
33. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-18(C).
34. See State v. Johnson, 122 N.M. 713, 715, 930 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 122 N.M. 578,
929 P.2d 269 (1996).
35. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-18(C).
36. See Johnson, 122 N.M. at 716,930 P.2d at 1168.
37. See, e.g., Veiga v. McGee, 26 F.3d 1206, 1212 (1st Cir. 1994).
38. See, e.g., Cesaroni v. Smith, 202 A.2d 292, 296 (R.I. 1964).
39. See Veiga, 26F.3dat 1211.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. See Cesaroni,202 A.2d at 296. The court interpreted the statute in question as not requiring a showing
of conduct that constitutes a "criminal offense designated as disorderly conduct." Id.
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a different standard from Rhode Island's criminal offense of disorderly conduct.4 3
This is the approach eventually followed by the Johnson court."
2. Determining When a Person Constitutes a Danger
In determining when an intoxicated person constitutes a danger which justifies
detention, courts follow a "reasonableness" standard.45 A court must determine that
a reasonable police officer would have found that the intoxicated person was unable
to care for his own safety and constituted a danger to others.46 An officer need only
have reasonable "cause to believe" or "probable cause" to believe that a defendant
is disorderly, intoxicated, and a danger to others.47 The reasonableness and probable
cause standards were articulated by New Mexico courts in State ex reL Schwartz v.
Kennedy48 and State v. Warren.4
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that an officer needed only reasonable
grounds to believe the defendant in that case was intoxicated.'o The New Mexico
Court of Appeals also followed this line of reasoning when it held that an officer may
use "sensory perceptions" and "reasonable inferences" to develop probable cause.5'
Determining the Scope of a Lawful Inventory Search
Before placing a person in a jail cell, police conduct a procedure commonly known
as an inventory search. 52 The objectives behind inventory searches are: 1) to protect
an arrestee's property while he is in jail; 2) to protect the police from claims of lost
or stolen property; 3) to safeguard the detention facility by preventing introduction
of objects that could be used for an escape or to harm other prisoners or officers; and
(4) to ascertain the identity of the person being incarcerated.53 An inventory is a
"well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment."' The
inventory search can often lead officers to find material that incriminates a detainee
for a crime, even though the detainee was in custody for a non-criminal purpose.
Although that is not a permissible purpose of the inventory search,55 it is a frequent
C.

43. See id.

44. See State v. Johnson, 122 N.M. 713,716-17,930 P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (Ct. App.), cert. denied. 122 N.M.
578, 929 P.2d 269 (1996). The court also adopted the definition of "disorderly" provided by BLACK'S LAW
DICrnONARY 469 (6th ed. 1990) (disorderly defined as contrary to rules of good order and behavior, violative of public
peace or good order, turbulent, riotous, or indecent). See Johnson, 122 N.M. at 716, 930 P.2d at 1168.
45. See Johnson, 122 N.M. at 717, 930 P.2d at 1169.
46. Seeid. at 716, 930 P.2d at 1168.
47. Seeid. at 717, 930 P.2d at 1169.
48. 120 N.M. 619,627,904 P.2d 1044, 1052 (1995).
49. 103 N.M. 472, 476, 709 P.2d 194, 198 (Ct. App. 1985).
50. See Schwartz, 120 N.M. at 627, 904 P.2d at 1052.
51. Warren, 103 N.M. at 476, 709 P.2d at 198.
52. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644-46 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369
(1976). See also Robert M. Goldfried, Note, The Inventory Search of an Offender Arrestedfor a Minor Traffic
Violation: Its Scope and ConstitutionalRequirements, 53 B.U. L REV. 858 (1973).
53. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987); Opperman,428 U.S. at 366. See also 3 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEmURE: A TRTETISE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT § 5.3(a) (3d ed. 1996).
54. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371; see also Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 643.
55. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) ("An inventory search must not be a ruse for general
rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.").
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result. An inventory search that resulted in incriminating evidence of a crime was the
source of contention in Johnson.56
1. New Mexico Case Law on Inventory Searches
While New Mexico courts have not addressed the issue of a lawful inventory
search of a civil detainee, they have addressed lawful inventory searches of arrestees.
The four requirements for a lawful inventory search in New Mexico are: 1) the police
have control or custody of objects of the search; 2) the inventory is made according
to established police procedure; 3) the search is reasonable; and 4) there is some
reasonable connection between the arrest and the reason for taking possession of the
property.57
In both State v. Boswell" and State v. Shaw,59 New Mexico courts addressed the
permissible scope and reasonableness of inventory searches conducted by police
officers after taking persons into custody. In Shaw, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals noted that the scope of a permissible inventory search is broad and often
permits every item or container found on an arrestee to be opened and searched, as
long as the search is conducted according to clearly established procedures.' The
search is "reasonable" if conducted
Boswell court determined that an inventory
"pursuant to established procedures.",61 The difference between these cases and
Johnson is that they involved inventory searches pursuant to an arrest, rather than a
mere detainment for safety purposes. The analysis in Boswell and Shaw were based
on the four requirements outlined above.
2. Supreme Court Case Law on Inventory Searches
The Supreme Court of the United States has had a few occasions to consider the
validity and permissible scope of inventory searches.' However, the Supreme Court
has only considered the validity of inventory searches of persons and their property
when the person has been placed under arrest. The Supreme Court has consistently
upheld the inventory search on the basis of the governmental interests met by the
procedure.63 The Supreme Court requires that inventory searches be conducted
according to standard police procedures in order to be reasonable and permissible.6

56. See State v. Johnson, 122 N.M. 713, 930 P.2d 1165 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 122 N.M. 578, 929 P.2d 269
(1996).

57. See State v. Williams, 97 N.M. 634,636-37,642 P.2d 1093, 1095-96, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 845 (1982);
see also State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, 502, 612 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1980).
58. 111 N.M. 240, 804 P.2d 1059 (1991).
59. 115 N.M. 174, 848 P.2d 1101 (Ct. App. 1993).
60. See id. at 176-77, 848 P.2d at 1103-04.
61. 111 N.M. at 243, 804 P.2d at 1062.
62. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
63. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373; Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 647; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369. In upholding
inventory searches, the Court was concerned with the legitimate governmental interests in protecting a detainee's
property, protecting the police from claims of lost or stolen property, and protecting the police and persons in jail from
dangerous items.
64. See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4-5; Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374-75; Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648; Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 376.
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In Illinois v. Lafayette, the Supreme Court has also addressed the argument that
an inventory search was unreasonable because the governmental interests at stake
could have been protected through less intrusive means." The Lafayette Court
rejected this argument and concluded that the question is not what could have been
achieved through less intrusive means, but whether the Fourth Amendment requires
such less intrusive means.' The Supreme Court determined that it was not the
Court's function to write a manual on administering routine and neutral procedures
at a police station. 67 The Court also determined that the reasonableness of a
6
governmental activity does not depend on the existence of less intrusive means.
Even if some less intrusive means existed to protect some of the detainee's property,
it would not be reasonable for the Court to require officers to make "fine and subtle
distinctions" in determining which containers to search and which to seal as a unit.69
The Supreme Court in Floridav. Wells did not support the idea that an inventory
search could be used for "general rummaging" with the purpose of locating
incriminating evidence."0 As a result, the practice or established policy regarding
inventory searches should be designed with the purpose of making an inventory." A
police officer should not be given so much latitude that an inventory search turns into
a method of discovering evidence of a crime.' However, the Wells Court determined
that an officer should be given enough latitude to determine whether certain
containers should or should not be opened, depending on the nature of the search and
the characteristics of the container.
Thus, the Supreme Court supports the practice of inventory searches, so long as
they are conducted according to established procedures designed to meet legitimate
governmental interests. Additionally, the Supreme Court would not second-guess
police officers by considering whether less intrusive means were available.
3. The Permissible Scope of Inventory Searches in Other Jurisdictions
While neither the New Mexico nor the United States Supreme Court has had
previous occasion to consider inventory searches of mere detainees, other
jurisdictions have considered such a situation. These jurisdictions are split regarding
the permissible scope of an inventory search with regard to detox detainees under
acts similar to the New Mexico Detox Act. 74 Cases involving an inventory of the

65. See 462 U.S. at647.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. The Lafayette Court did not find it appropriate for a court to "second-guess police departments as
to what practical administrative method will best deter theft by and false claims against its employees and preserve
the security of the stationhouse." Id at 648.
69. See id.
70. See 495 U.S. at 4.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., People v. Chaves, 855 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1993) (en banc); People v. Dandrea, 736 P.2d 1211
(Colo. 1987) (en banc); cf People v. Carper, 876 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1994) (en banc); State v. Friend, 711 S.W.2d 508
(Mo. 1986) (en banc); State v. Gelvin, 318 N.W.2d 302, 304 (N.D. 1982).
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contents in closed containers, such as purses, wallets and small containers, have
proven especially difficult.75
The cases where courts held that an inventory search exceeded its permissible
scope based their decisions on one of two rationales: 1) the search was "unreasonable" resulting in a violation of the Fourth Amendment; or 2) the non-criminal nature
of detention under detoxification acts requires greater protection of the detainee.
Because detainees under detox acts are not to be treated as criminals, some courts
have76 held that an intrusive search should not be conducted when placing them in
jail.
In People v. Chaves,77 the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a warrantless
search of a folded dollar bill was unreasonable. 7 The court relied on its precedent in
79
which held that a person detained for protective custody could
People v. Dandrea,
not be searched as thoroughly as one who had been arrested.' Dandrea'sholding
was based on the state's clear legislative policy which required police officers to treat
civil protective detentions differently from criminal arrests."' The Dandrea court
recognized that privacy interests of the custodial detainee must be balanced against
the legitimate governmental interest in protecting the safety of the officer as well as
the safety of the detainee. 2 The Chaves court concluded that when an inventory
search is conducted pursuant to protective custody, the scope of the inventory search
is limited by the privacy interest of the detainee. 3 As a result, any closed containers
must remain closed unless and until a warrant is obtained."
Where the courts have found an inventory search inside of a closed container to
be lawful, they have based their decisions on the objectives behind inventory
searches: 1) to protect the detainee's property; 2) to protect police from claims of
theft; and 3) to protect the detainee and others in jail from dangerous items. The
courts have applied a balancing test, but have given more weight to the states'
interests in meeting the objectives of inventory searches. As a result, these cases
permit broader inventory searches of a civil detainee.
In State v. Gelvin, 5 the Supreme Court of North Dakota addressed the issue of
whether evidence seized from an intoxicated person's wallet during an inventory
search should be suppressed. 6 The Gelvin court noted that the "reasonableness under
the circumstances" standard should be used to determine the constitutionality of an
inventory search. 7

75. See Gelvin, 318 N.w.2d at 304.
76. See, e.g., Chaves, 855 P.2d at 855; Dandrea, 736 P.2d at 1217.
77. 855 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1993) (en banc).
78. See id. at 855.
79. 736 P.2d 1211 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
80. See id. at 1215.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Chaves, 855 P.2d at 855.
84. See id.
85. 318 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1982).
86. See id. at 304.
87. See id. at 305. The court was following Supreme Court precedent, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976), which applied the reasonableness standard to an inventory search of an automobile.
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The Gelvin court noted that some courts faced with the issue of inventorying items
contained in closed containers have held that such containers should be inventoried
as a unit without searching their contents.88 However, others have held the contents
of closed containers must be inventoried to protect important interests .89 The Gelvin
court points out that courts have generally employed a balancing test, weighing the
detainee's right of privacy against the state's interest delineated above.'
The Gelvin court determined that the officers' inventory of items in the
defendant's wallet was proper in that case, but made it clear that they were not
making a general decision regarding inventory searches of closed containers.91 The
court found it permissible to inventory a wallet under established procedure.92 The
Gelvin court concluded that it was necessary for the officers to inventory the contents
of the wallet in order to protect the three interests set forth above. 93 The Gelvin court
employed the balancing test and found in favor of the state interests.' Additionally,
the Gelvin court held that if an item or container is not securely closed, officers can
inventory the contents. 95
Ultimately, the Gelvin court found that the policy consideration behind "jailhouse
inventory searches of arrestees are equally applicable when a person is brought into
the jail for detoxification."9' This was because the main objectives are safety of the
detainee and others in jail and the protection of the detoxification detainee's
possessions. 7 These safety considerations are not forgotten simply because the
person being placed in jail is not under arrest.
In State v. Lippert,9 8 the Supreme Court of Oregon also held that evidence
discovered during a detoxification inventory search would not be suppressed. 99 In
Lippert, the defendant was taken into custody for detoxification and an inventory
search resulted in the removal of a paperfold from his pocket.' ° Upon opening the
paperfold, the jailer discovered cocaine. t°0 The Lippert court found that the purpose
of the state detoxification act was to decriminalize intoxication,1 2 not to enforce the
provisions of the Fourth Amendment. °3 The court concluded that "[t]he police were

88. See id.
89. See id. The interests include: 1) protection of detainee's property; 2) protection of the police against claims
of lost or stolen property; and 3) protection of police and others from dangerous items. See id.
90. See id.

91. See id.
92. See id.; see also United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Gallop, 606 F.2d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gardner, 480 F.2d 929, 931 (10th Cir. 1973).
93. See 318 N.W.2d at 306.
94. See id.

95. See id. (explaining that because wallets are generally not securely closed, police can inventory their
contents).
96. Id. at 307.
97. See id. at 305.
98. 856 P.2d 634 (Or. 1993) (en banc).
99. See id at 638-39; see also State v. Friend, 711 S.W.2d 508, 510-11 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (establishing
that an inventory search of person brought to jail for detoxification was proper and evidence thus discovered did not
have to be suppressed).
100. See Lippert, 856 P.2d at 635.
101. See id. at 635-36.
102. See id. at 638 (citing State v. Okeke, 745 P.2d 418 (Or. 1987)).
103. See id.(citing State v. Westlund, 729 P.2d 541 (Or. 1986) (arguing that the purpose of the statute is
unrelated to protecting persons from illegal searches and seizures)).
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entitled to seize... inadvertently discovered evidence.., which was in plain view,
without a warrant" and use it at defendant's criminal trial."°
The cases above illustrate the split in reasoning regarding the scope of an
inventory search of a detoxification detainee. The court in Johnson followed the more
liberal decisions allowing a broader scope for such inventory searches which have
permitted officers to search containers.'0 5
IV. RATIONALE
A.

Johnson Court Finds Lawful Civil Detention Under Detox Act
The Johnson court found Johnson's detention lawful based on evidence that
transportation of Johnson to jail was necessary because he was disorderly and
constituted a danger to others." 6 Johnson appeared intoxicated, based on his
bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and the smell of alcohol. The appearance of
intoxication, together with Johnson's use of profane language, was sufficient
evidence for the arresting officer to believe Johnson was disorderly under the Detox
Act.'0 7
The court of appeals held that the applicable canons of construction did not require
a finding that the definition of disorderly in the Detox Act was equivalent to the
crime of disorderly conduct.' The court found that there would be no need for the
Detox Act if disorderly was equivalent to the New Mexico statutes' definition of
criminal disorderly conduct." Police officers "would simply arrest disorderly
intoxicated persons for the crime of disorderly conduct and take them to jail" if the
definitions were the same." 0 The legislature's enactment of a hierarchy of responses
to be used when dealing with disorderly intoxicated persons convinced the court of
appeals that "disorderly" as used in section 43-2-18(C) of the Detox Act has a
different meaning than the disorderly conduct in the criminal statute.' 11 Additionally,
2
the court noted that detention under the Detox Act was not criminal.
The court also rejected Johnson's contention that the Detox Act requires officers
to choose the least drastic alternative." 3 Although the court agreed that the Act
established a series of alternatives, the court did not agree that the officers were
mandated to take Johnson home in this case.11 4 Additional factors, including
Johnson's combative behavior and the officer's discovery of a loaded gun in the
104. See id. at 639.
105. See State v. Johnson, 122 N.M. 713, 718-19, 930 P.2d 1165, 1170-71 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 122 N.M.
578, 929 P.2d 269 (1996).
106. See id. at716,930P.2dat 1168.
107. See id.
108. See id. The court of appeals disagreed with some courts which have held to the contrary. See id. (citing
Veiga v. McGee, 26 F.3d 1206, 1211-12 (1st Cir. 1994)).
109. See id. For a statutory definition of disorderly conduct in the criminal context see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3020-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1993).
110. Johnson, 122 P.2d at 716-17, 930 P.2d at 1168-69.
11. See id. at 717, 930 P.2d at 1169. The hierarchy of responses includes taking the intoxicated persons home,
taking them to a health care facility, or taking them to jail for detoxification. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-18(A)-(C)
(Repl. Pamp. 1993).
112. See Johnson, 122 N.M. at 717, 930 P.2d at 1169 (citing to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-22(C)).
113. See id. (Johnson argued that he should have been driven home rather than transported to jail.).
114. See id.
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vehicle, were sufficient to persuade a reasonable police officer that Johnson was a
danger unless transported to jail."1 5 Under the circumstances of this case, the court
that the least drastic choice under the Detox Act was to transport Johnson to
found
116
jail.
The court of appeals also rejected Johnson's contention that there was not clear
and convincing evidence that his actions were disorderly or constituted a danger to
others. 17 The court held that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard should be
applied by a tribunal, not by officers working on the street." 8 The standard to be used
by officers is "cause to believe," rather than "clear and convincing evidence.""' 9 An
officer need only have "probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe" that a
person they have encountered is "disorderly, intoxicated, and dangerous" to others."
The court did emphasize that an officer's conduct is circumscribed by the Detox
Act's requirements.' If these requirements have not been met, an officer cannot
transport an intoxicated person to jail, but must take the intoxicated person home or
to a health care facility."
Court Finds Discovery of Cocaine was Result of Lawful Inventory Search
The second issue involved the discovery of crack cocaine in Johnson's clothing.
Johnson argued that protective custody of an intoxicated person does not allow police
officers to remove personal belongings, especially small items inside their pockets."z
Johnson also argued that even if officers can take possession of intoxicated persons'
possessions for inventory purposes, the inside of items cannot be searched. 24
The court of appeals rejected Johnson's contentions based on State v. Shaw,"z
which established that inventory searches are allowed if they are reasonable and
conducted according to established police procedures." The court held that an
inventory search is reasonable if its objectives are: 1) to protect an arrestee's
property; 2) to protect police against claims of lost or stolen property; or 3) to protect
police from potential danger. 27 The court concluded that an inventory search may
B.

115.

See id.

116. See id.
117. See id.
(citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,423-24 (1979)). Unlike courts, a officer does not have
118. See id.
time to make detailed inquiries into evidence while he isencountering situations on the street. See id.
119.

See id.; c.f.State ex reL Schwartz v. Kennedy, 120 N.M. 619, 627-28, 904 P.2d 1044, 1052-53 (1995)

(establishing that a license may be revoked if law enforcement officer had "reasonable grounds to believe" driver was
intoxicated); State v. Mann, 103 N.M. 660, 663, 712 P.2d 6, 9 (Ct. App. 1985) (establishing that officer must have
"reasonable suspicion") (citation omitted); State v. Warren, 103 N.M. 472, 476, 709 P.2d 194, 198 (Ct. App. 1985)
(arguing that an arresting officer may combine "sensory perceptions" and "reasonable inferences" to give rise to
probable cause) (citation omitted).
120. Johnson, 122 N.M. at 717, 930 P.2d at 1169.
at 718, 930 P.2d at 1170.
121. See id.
122. See id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-18 (Repl. Pamp. 1993).
123.
124.

See Johnson, 122 N.M. at 718, 930 P.2d at 1170.
See id.

125. 115 N.M. 174, 848 P.2d I101 (Ct. App. 1993). However, Shaw involved an inventory search of a criminal
arrestee. See id.

126. See Johnson, 122 N.M. at 718, 930 P.2d at 1170 (citing Shaw, 115 N.M. at 176, 484 P.2d at 1103).
127. See id. (citing Shaw,115 N.M. at 177,484 P.2d at 1104).
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include a search inside a container if conducted according to established police
procedure."
The court found that it was standard procedure for officers to inventory belongings
of intoxicated persons brought to jail for detoxification.129 Additionally, the court
found it was reasonable for officers to conduct an inventory search of a person being
placed in the jail in order to protect officers from claims of lost property and to
prevent harm faced by the officers and others 3 ° Thus, the court concluded that an
inventory search of Johnson's possessions was warranted.'
Johnson also argued that the rules regarding inventories should not apply to
detainees under the Detox Act because they are not to be treated as criminals.' The
court, however, disagreed and stated that "the rationale behind inventory searches
applies equally to criminal arrestees and civil detainees."1' In situations involving
criminal arrestees or civil detainees, officers encounter similar risks, such as claims
of lost property or danger to either the officer, the detainee, or third parties.134
The court did not address Johnson's argument that the officers did not have the
right to make him get undressed and put on jail clothing because it already held the
inventory search was proper.1 35 The court rationalized that even if Johnson had not
been forcibly stripped, a lawful inventory search would have inevitably resulted in
the discovery of the "Life Savers" container. 36
Johnson also contended that the "Life Savers" container was improperly opened
by the officers. 137 The court again would not address this issue because the container
was transparent and the rocks of cocaine were in plain view.1 38 The court stated that
"[w]hen evidence is discovered because it is in plain view, there is no invasion
of
139
privacy and the discovery of the evidence does not constitute a search.'
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF JOHNSON
A.

The Johnson Court Reaffirms Probable Cause Standard to be Applied by
Officers
The Johnson court upheld the reasonableness standard that must be applied to
determine if the officers' conduct was lawful.14 The court simply rearticulated that
to detain someone under the Detox Act, an officer need only have reasonable "cause
to believe" or "probable cause" to believe that a defendant is disorderly, intoxicated,

128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Sedd See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-22(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1993) (explaining that an intoxicated person
held in protective custody in jail under the Detox Act shall not be considered arrested or charged with a crime).
133. Jbhnson, 122 N.M. at 718, 930 P.2d at 1170.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 718-19, 930 P.2d at 1170-71.
137. See id. at 719, 930 P.2d at 1171.
138. See id.
139. Id. (citing State v. Williams, 117 N.M. 551, 555-56, 874 P.2d 12, 16-17 (1994)).
140. See Johnson, 122 N.M. at 718,930 P.2d at 1169. The reasonableness standard was applied to the officers'
determination that Johnson was intoxicated, disorderly, and constituted a danger to others. See id.
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and a danger to others. 41 Thus, the court found that the officers' decision to take
Johnson to jail was warranted because there was a reasonable basis to find that the
requirements of the Detox Act were sufficiently met to apply the strictest alternative,
that being taking Johnson to jail.'
The Johnson Court Follows the Supreme Court and Other Jurisdictions
Allowing a Broad Inventory Search
The Johnson decision establishes important precedent for New Mexico in its
treatment of the permissible scope of an inventory search under the Detox Act. The
Johnson court's holding appears unfair to detainees placed in protective custody
under the Detox Act because it allows a broad inventory search of their person, even
though they are not under arrest for a criminal act. However, this holding is in line
with the reasoning of the Supreme Court 43 and a majority of jurisdictions that have
considered this issue.'" It is customary procedure in most jurisdictions for an
inventory to involve an exhaustive search of everything in the pockets or on the body
of a person going into the jail, regardless of whether it is criminal, civil, or protective
detention."' This includes looking into his wallet or into containers found on the
detainee.'"
There have been a number of cases in which courts have found it permissible to
inventory the contents of a detainee's possessions if such inventory is done pursuant
to established police procedure. 147 Inventory searches have been upheld by the
Supreme Court and in most jurisdictions because of their relationship to legitimate
jail custodial purposes. 4 The policies behind routine jail inventory searches of
arrestees have been49found to be equally applicable when a person is brought into jail
for detoxification.1
The Johnson court's reasoning also follows New Mexico precedent with regard
to inventory searches in the arrest context. Although the New Mexico precedent dealt
only with inventory searches incident to arrest, the Johnson court used general
principles established in those cases.' 5" However, the Johnson court's position would
B.

141. See id. at 717-18, 930 P.2d at 1168-69 (citations omitted); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979); State ex rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy, 120 N.M. 619, 904 P.2d 1044 (1995); State v. Warren, 103 N.M. 472,
709 P.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1985).
142. Seeid. at718,930P.2dat 1170.
143. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
144. See, e.g., State v. Friend, 711 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986); State v. Gelvin, 318 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1982);
State v. Uppert, 856 P.2d 634 (Or. 1993).
145. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376; 1.AFAVE, supra note 53, § 5.3(a), at 112.
146. See LAAVE, supra note 53, § 5.3(a), at 113. See also Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648 (arguing that it is not

unreasonable for police to search any container or article in the possession of an arrestee, in accordance with
established inventory procedure).

147. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376; State v. Gelvin, 318 N.W.2d 302, 305 (N.D.
1982).
148. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 646; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376; Gelvin, 318 N.W.2d at 306; see also Friend,
711 S.W.2d at 510-11 (explaining that inventory searches meet legitimate jail custodial purposes in that they prevent
the introduction of dangerous items into the jail and prevent the loss of detainee property).
149. See Friend,711 S.W.2d at 510; Gelvin, 318 N.W.2d at 307.
150. As mentioned earlier, these cases established four requirements to determine whether a lawful inventory
search has been conducted. The requirements are: 1)that police have control or custody of objects of the search; 2)
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have been stronger if it applied the analysis of these cases to the facts of Johnson. For
instance, the requirements set out in Williams1"' and Ruffino 5 2 could have been
applied to determine whether the inventory search in Johnson was reasonable.
Finally, the Johnson court decision that the Life Savers container was properly
opened cannot be challenged because the container was transparent.' There can be
no claim of invasion of privacy "when evidence is discovered because it is in plain
view."' ' Discovery of evidence in plain view does not constitute a search.'"
C.

Arguments Against Following the Majority Position
While the decision in Johnson is in line with the reasoning of a majority of
jurisdictions and New Mexico precedent with regard to inventory searches, Johnson's
argument that detainees under the Detox Act are not criminals and therefore entitled
to greater Fourth Amendment protection is a valid one. The Supreme Court has even
determined that "[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to
search."' 6 Thus, it can be inferred that mere detainment of a person for detoxification
purposes does not give police the authority to conduct an inventory search. Without
the arrest, there is no authority.
It was the New Mexico Legislature's intention when it enacted the Detox Act that
an intoxicated person held in protective custody should not be considered an arrestee
or a criminal.'57 In a minority of jurisdictions, persons taken into custody for
detoxification are afforded greater protection than criminal arrestees because there
is no arrest involved.5 8 As a result, exhaustive inventory searches of intoxicated
persons taken into protective custody are not permitted and any search should be less
intrusive than in a criminal arrest situation. 5 9 The emphasis on the non-criminal
nature of taking an intoxicated person into custody requires that the individual
privacy interest of that person be "accorded maximum weight when determining the
reasonableness of police conduct. ' ' "W
Johnson involved an intoxicated person being taken into custody for
detoxification, not for an arrest. Following the rationale in the previously discussed
cases,' 6 1 Johnson should have been entitled to greater Fourth Amendment protection

that the inventory is made according to established police procedure; 3) that the search is reasonable; and 4) that there
is some reasonable connection between the arrest and the reason for taking possession of the property. See State v.
Williams, 97 N.M. 634, 636-37, 642 P.2d 1093, 1095-96, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 845 (1982); State v. Ruffino, 94
N.M. 500, 502, 612 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1980).
151. 97 N.M. at 636-37, 642 P.2d at 3095-96.
152. 94 N.M. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
153. See State v. Johnson, 122 N.M. 713, 719, 930 P.2d 1165, 1171 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 122 N.M. 578,
929 P.2d 269 (1996).
154. Id. (citing State v. Williams, 117 N.M. 551, 555-56, 874 P.2d 12, 16-17 (1994)).
155. See id.
156. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 645 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
157. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-22 (C) (Repl. Pamp. 1993).
158. See, e.g.,
State v. Perry, 688 P.2d 827, 831 (Or. 1984).
159. See id; see also People v. Chaves, 855 P.2d 852, 855 (Colo. 1993) (en banc); People v. Dandrea, 736 P.2d
1211, 1217 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); State v. Lawrence, 648 P.2d 1332, 1337 (Or. App. 1982).
160. Dandrea, 736 P.2d at 1217.
161. See, e.g., Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 645 (explaining that the existence of a lawful arrest establishes the
authority to search); Perry, 688 P.2d at 831 (arguing that persons taken into jail for detoxification have greater
protection than criminal arrestees).
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than a criminal arrestee.'6 An inventory search of a detoxification detainee conducted
in such a broad manner as to allow a search inside containers based merely on the
fact that it is standard procedure is a weak argument.16 3 Courts have been too quick
to uphold inventories that result in evidence of a crime simply because of the
"routineness" of the procedures.'" The institutionalization of a constitutionally
questionable procedure, however, does not make it permissible." Jail security is not
jeopardized by setting aside an item or container and not opening it, or waiting to
obtain a search warrant before opening it.'"
It has been proposed that items found during an inventory prior to incarceration
should be inadmissible in criminal proceedings. 67 Discovery of evidence of a crime
is not the purpose of an inventory search.1 68 An inventory search permits officers to
remove and isolate all dangerous possessions and to retain the items while a
defendant is in custody, but should not permit the officers to search closed containers
unless a warrant is first obtained."6 Once a package or container is "confiscated and
identified as a probable weapon," 7° the limited purpose of the inventory search has
been accomplished."' Thus, there must be further justification for any additional
intrusion to support a search of the seized package or container. 2
Broad inventory searches, when a person is in jail for detoxification, invite police
intrusion on the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The inventory search is particularly susceptible to abuse by officers with an
investigatory motive to conduct a search, without having probable cause. 7 3 The
broad scope of the search, the abusive manner in which it can be used by officers,
and the potential for its use as a device to circumvent constitutional requirements,
makes the procedure allowed by the Johnson court appear unreasonable.7 4
D. Least Intrusive Means-Alternativesto Allowing an Inventory Search Inside
Containers
While the Supreme Court has not required courts to second-guess police officers
by considering less intrusive means to meet the governmental interests behind
inventory searches, the objective of safeguarding a suspect and other prisoners could
be met by methods other than an exhaustive generalized search. 75 There is no

162. See id; see alsoDandrea,736 P.2d 1211; State v. Newman, 637 P.2d 143 (Or. 198 1), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1111 (1982).
163. Goldfried, supra note 52, at 866.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Chaves, 855 P.2d at 854-55.
167. See LAFAVE, supra note 53, § 5.3(a), at 115.
168. See Goldfried, supra note 52, at 866; see also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (arguing that the
inventory search must not be used for the purpose of discovering incriminating evidence); Chaves, 855 P.2d at 855
(explaining that the purpose of an inventory of a detainee is not to find drugs, but to ensure that all the detainee's
possessions are safe).
169. See Chaves, 855 P.2d at 855.
170. Dandrea,736 P.2d at 1218.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See Goldfried, supra note 52, at 866-67.
174. See id. at 866 ("The question is one of reasonableness, not routineness.").
175. See id.
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sufficient justification to conduct an exhaustive search with the sole purpose of
taking inventory when there are other alternatives available.'7 6 An invasion of the.
fundamental right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures may be more
acceptable to the public if the invasion is the least intrusive possible.
Legal scholarship suggests that inventory searches should be limited in scope, so
that a search into closed or sealed containers, including packages or purses, would
be prohibited. 177 The basis for limiting inventory searches and preventing a search
into closed containers is that discovery of further evidence hidden inside a container
is not a proper function of an inventory search.17 If there is probable cause that a
detainee has committed other crimes, a search warrant could be obtained later to
examine such containers.
There are alternatives the New Mexico courts and legislature can consider to
lessen the possible harm caused by inventory searches. These suggestions would
make it impermissible for officers to search containers belonging to detoxification
detainees during an inventory search. One suggestion would allow a detainee to store
in a privileged place, such as a safety deposit box, personal items which he would not
like to take into the jail. 179 Other suggestions would provide the detainee with a
storage locker. 8
These alternative methods would provide greater protection of the fundamental
right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures. They would also meet the
objectives of an inventory search: 1) to protect the detainee's possessions while in
jail; 2) to protect the police from claims of theft and stolen property; and 3) to
safeguard a detainee and other prisoners by placing any dangerous possessions of a
detainee in a safe place.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court in Johnson essentially affirmed the standard of reasonableness for
officers on the street in determining whether a person is intoxicated, disorderly, and
a danger to others. The Johnson court also effectively applied Supreme Court
principles with regard to inventory searches in arrest situations to a Detox detention.
Therefore, the court has followed the conclusion of a majority of jurisdictions that
an inventory search of a person being placed in jail for detoxification can have as
broad a scope as an inventory search in an arrest situation. This includes allowing a
search inside containers found on the person. The objectives behind this type of
search is to protect the detainee's property, to protect officers from claims of theft,
and to protect officers, the detainee and other jail inmates from dangerous items.
However, New Mexico should consider the position of the minority of jurisdictions
that limit the scope of inventory searches of detainees. This position advocates a type

176. See id.
177. See id. at 869.
178. See Goldfried, supra note 52, at 866.
179. See Paul R. Friedman, Note, Scope Limitationsfor Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE .J. 433, 445
(1969); see also LAFAVE, supra note 53, § 5.3(a), at 114-15 (supporting the placement of detainees' belongings in
closed or sealed containers); State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 62 (Haw. 1974) (supporting the placement of detainees'
possessions in a sealed envelope).
180. See Goldfried, supra note 52, at 869-70.
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of search that still protects the objectives behind the inventory search, while at the
same time protecting the individual privacy rights. Placing the property in a secured
area would protect the property, protect the officers from claims of theft, and protect
the detainee and other persons from dangerous items, but would not infringe on the
detainee's right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures.
JAELEEN J. KOOKESH

